“The September coup was applauded by politicians and ordinary people, and the leader of the opposition welcomed the overthrow stating that the army had saved the country from dictatorship.” It could have been Thailand in 2006, but the above quote was a response to another extra-legal transfer of power in the African nation of Guinea-Bissau, 3 years ago, September 2003.
It is distressing when elected governments are uprooted by their national military forces, even when they use their power to remove an unpopular and autocratic ruler. Are their other options?
In Thailand not only did those options exist, they were successful, but then subsequently failed.
In Thailand not only did those options exist, they were successful, but then subsequently failed.
The coup d'etat in Thailand in September 2006 took some outside Thailand by surprise, but few in the Thai military. A Royal Thai Army Major-General told me the day after the coup it had been expected, and had received the prior blessings of the King. Former Prime Minister, Taksin may also have been in the know, if allegations reported in some foreign press are true that he departed the country with 119 suitcases. A Bangkok paper observed that some Ministers from his party began cleaning out their desks and permanently leaving their offices the afternoon before, suggesting that the coup may have been an elaborate piece of political theatre negotiated with an autocrat to create a face saving exit for the former strong man.
However, it needs to be remembered that it was the second time in that year, that particular Prime Minister had been removed from power.
However, it needs to be remembered that it was the second time in that year, that particular Prime Minister had been removed from power.
In March of 2006, in a people’s power uprising, reminiscent of the 1986 Philippine popular revolution 20 years before, hundreds of thousands of ordinary Thai people renounced their ordinary pastimes and sat in the streets calling for the Prime Ministers immediate departure under the People's Alliance for Democracy. This included an electoral boycott with a massive NO vote when the Prime Minister dissolved parliament to combat the protests.
Once his legitimacy was destroyed, the popular, nonviolent revolt drove Prime Minister Taksin out of office, with a public pledge that he would never return.
The People's Alliance for Democracy made the mistake of believing him, and disbanded.
With the relaxing of popular pressure, Taksin cunningly recycled himself into a ‘caretaker Prime Minister’, and thanks to the electoral boycott, was then able to exercise total, unrestrained, power without the annoying presence of an opposition in parliament.
Patience with Taksin’s subterfuge and arrogance grew and the Alliance began a second mobilization, organizing their first mass demonstration to 'finish the job'. The night previous to the renewed street demonstations, another revolt against the unpopular Prime Minister was mobilized- by a much smaller group of people- 6 Thai senior military officers.
They did not have the moral force of the thousands of citizens who had taken to the streets the previous March. They had guns. While they did not use them, the threat of violence the weapons embodied in the weapons in their possession, and forces trained to use them, allowed them to seize and hold key government buildings and TV stations.
Interestingly, the seizure of power by the military forces may have played a violence prevention role, according to a Bangkok Post analysis published the morning after the Coup. Former Police Lieutenant Colonel, cum Prime Minister, Taksin was a man who used violence easily, and gained particular notoriety for the thousands of extra-judicial executions which took place during his 'War' on Drugs. Taksin had prepared during his caretaker period to counter any further exercises in people’s power by outright violent assault.
Once his legitimacy was destroyed, the popular, nonviolent revolt drove Prime Minister Taksin out of office, with a public pledge that he would never return.
The People's Alliance for Democracy made the mistake of believing him, and disbanded.
With the relaxing of popular pressure, Taksin cunningly recycled himself into a ‘caretaker Prime Minister’, and thanks to the electoral boycott, was then able to exercise total, unrestrained, power without the annoying presence of an opposition in parliament.
Patience with Taksin’s subterfuge and arrogance grew and the Alliance began a second mobilization, organizing their first mass demonstration to 'finish the job'. The night previous to the renewed street demonstations, another revolt against the unpopular Prime Minister was mobilized- by a much smaller group of people- 6 Thai senior military officers.
They did not have the moral force of the thousands of citizens who had taken to the streets the previous March. They had guns. While they did not use them, the threat of violence the weapons embodied in the weapons in their possession, and forces trained to use them, allowed them to seize and hold key government buildings and TV stations.
Interestingly, the seizure of power by the military forces may have played a violence prevention role, according to a Bangkok Post analysis published the morning after the Coup. Former Police Lieutenant Colonel, cum Prime Minister, Taksin was a man who used violence easily, and gained particular notoriety for the thousands of extra-judicial executions which took place during his 'War' on Drugs. Taksin had prepared during his caretaker period to counter any further exercises in people’s power by outright violent assault.
Taksin anticipated that the people may not accept his subterfuge, and that the People’s Alliance for Democracy might remobilize, so he prepared for a showdown by arming a particular battalion of Forestry Police to suppress any further popular nonviolent revolt in Bangkok. The Army knew this, since it had tried, unsuccessfully, to retrieve 1000 German made HK 33 assault rifles from the Forestry Police.
The military coup preceded the popular revolt by one day.
After the extra-constitutional power transfer took place, some European and North American governments condemned it, and demanded an early return to ‘normalcy’. The people who were attempting to oust the autocrat on the streets of Bangkok may appreciate these statements of concern, but a return to what was 'normal' before was not what these people want. They went to the streets in the first place to interrupt, condemn and displace the corruption and arbitrary abuse of power which was 'normal' under the Taksin regime, and under whom the organs of government, charged with checks and balance on government power, had been warped to irrelevance during his rule. Nothing less than a revolution would do.
The United States followed its condemnation of the coup with an announcement that it had cut military aid. US law prohibits provision of military aid to any country in which the military seizes power. This is a good policy, and all countries should subscribe to the principle of ceasing military business with all military regimes. However, a wiser and truly principled approach would require a halt in military trade to ANY government, however constituted, if it is involved in gross human rights abuses and the arbitrary killing of its own people. During the Taksin regime gross human rights violations involving extrajudicial executions, disappearances throughout the country and military atrocities in the South were increasing, but during which US military aid flowed to the country unimpeded.
“Those who make nonviolent revolutions impossible make violent revolutions inevitable”.
-former US President John F. Kennedy
Was a violent coup necessary, even if it was bloodless? Lets be clear, although the guns in their hands were not aimed and fired, it was the coercive presence of men organized, armed and trained to do armed violence, that allowed the coup to succeed, following the revolution where many, many more citizens, organized nonviolently, failed because they had taken the Prime Minister at his word.
The coup was bloodless, but hardly nonviolent. Taksin managed to sidestep his earlier defeat by popular forces using nonviolent means, because they had no fall back plan in case the PM made a false resignation. Once he revealed by his actions that he had no intention of bowing to public pressure, he assured further confrontation with popular forces committed to his removal.
The military coup preceded the popular revolt by one day.
After the extra-constitutional power transfer took place, some European and North American governments condemned it, and demanded an early return to ‘normalcy’. The people who were attempting to oust the autocrat on the streets of Bangkok may appreciate these statements of concern, but a return to what was 'normal' before was not what these people want. They went to the streets in the first place to interrupt, condemn and displace the corruption and arbitrary abuse of power which was 'normal' under the Taksin regime, and under whom the organs of government, charged with checks and balance on government power, had been warped to irrelevance during his rule. Nothing less than a revolution would do.
The United States followed its condemnation of the coup with an announcement that it had cut military aid. US law prohibits provision of military aid to any country in which the military seizes power. This is a good policy, and all countries should subscribe to the principle of ceasing military business with all military regimes. However, a wiser and truly principled approach would require a halt in military trade to ANY government, however constituted, if it is involved in gross human rights abuses and the arbitrary killing of its own people. During the Taksin regime gross human rights violations involving extrajudicial executions, disappearances throughout the country and military atrocities in the South were increasing, but during which US military aid flowed to the country unimpeded.
“Those who make nonviolent revolutions impossible make violent revolutions inevitable”.
-former US President John F. Kennedy
Was a violent coup necessary, even if it was bloodless? Lets be clear, although the guns in their hands were not aimed and fired, it was the coercive presence of men organized, armed and trained to do armed violence, that allowed the coup to succeed, following the revolution where many, many more citizens, organized nonviolently, failed because they had taken the Prime Minister at his word.
The coup was bloodless, but hardly nonviolent. Taksin managed to sidestep his earlier defeat by popular forces using nonviolent means, because they had no fall back plan in case the PM made a false resignation. Once he revealed by his actions that he had no intention of bowing to public pressure, he assured further confrontation with popular forces committed to his removal.
A showdown, which may well have involved the blood of the forces of nonviolence being shed, was averted by another force for violence which used its latent power to remove Taksin. Had the People’s Alliance for Democracy gone ahead, we can only speculate on the outcome, but possibly, like in 1992, the autocrat would have departed after washing the streets with blood. In this case, that may have been Taksin’s bargaining chip to negotiate a orderly departure, for his assets if not his ass, prior to the military coup.
The international community remained conspicuous in its absence until the end. If the global community really desiress to promote nonviolence, and its use to transfer power, it needs to conscientiously back genuine popular movements like the Peoples Alliance for Democracy, which demonstrate a commitment to nonviolence, in a timely way. Democracy sometimes needs to escape the ballot boxes and go out onto the street. When government power is corrupted, the environment in which ballots are cast can make them meaningless. If the world was standing beside the Thai popular revolution, it should have withdrawn recognition from the Taksin regime when he continued to exercise authority. By not doing so, they became complicit in the assured confrontation, and its result.
The international community remained conspicuous in its absence until the end. If the global community really desiress to promote nonviolence, and its use to transfer power, it needs to conscientiously back genuine popular movements like the Peoples Alliance for Democracy, which demonstrate a commitment to nonviolence, in a timely way. Democracy sometimes needs to escape the ballot boxes and go out onto the street. When government power is corrupted, the environment in which ballots are cast can make them meaningless. If the world was standing beside the Thai popular revolution, it should have withdrawn recognition from the Taksin regime when he continued to exercise authority. By not doing so, they became complicit in the assured confrontation, and its result.
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